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Race in the Courthouse: 
Less Protection as More Equal Protection for 
Musical Works 
 





During the past decade or so, stakeholders in the United States popular 
music sector have become rattled by the possibility of defending themselves 
against music copyright infringement allegations based on insignificant 
similarities, or even merely stylistic commonalities, between two musical 
works. Marquee pop performers like Pharrell Williams, Katy Perry, Ed 
Sheeran, Taylor Swift, and Led Zeppelin are among many popular musicians 
who have defended themselves against such claims, attesting the industry’s 
rueful maxim: “Have a hit, get a writ.”1 This unease among popular 
songwriters developed over several decades as courts and jurors became 
increasingly sympathetic towards infringement allegations involving 
musical works that could not be considered “copies” of an earlier work under 
any normative understanding of that term.2 
In 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict that 
“Blurred Lines,” a hit by Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams, infringed 
Marvin Gaye’s “Got to Give it Up.”3 Many musicians and copyright experts 
 
* B.M., Oberlin; J.D., American Univ.; M.A., Ph.D., Stanford; M.A. Info Systems, 
Berkeley. Charles Cronin is a Visiting Scholar at George Washington University Law 
School, and Adjunct Professor at Keck Graduate Institute, Claremont Colleges.   
1 See Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018); Gray v. Perry, No. 
2:15-cv-05642-CAS (JCX), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113807, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 5, 
2019); Griffin v. Sheeran, No. 17 Civ. 5221 (LLS), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52908, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2020); Hall v. Swift, 786 F. App’x 711, 711 (9th Cir. 2019); Skidmore 
v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2020).    
2 See Charles Cronin, I Hear America Suing: Music Copyright Infringement in the 
Era of Electronic Sound, 66 HASTINGS L. J. 1187, 1194 (2015) (suggesting that “[t]o 
appreciate how far we have strayed from the early conception of copyright as a means to 
counter wholesale copying of musical works, one must trace the evolution of case law in 
this area before popular music became a significant U.S. ‘industry’”).  
3 See Gaye, 895 F.3d at 1115.  
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deemed the verdict an untenable and confusing precedent.4 They argued that 
while the sound of the recorded performances of the songs share some 
stylistic similarities, there was no meaningful similarity of original musical 
expression.5 
In a trenchant dissenting opinion, Judge Jacqueline Nguyen predicted 
this verdict would inhibit the work of popular songwriters, making them 
vulnerable to claims of misappropriation of unprotectable generic musical 
elements and styles.6 Furthermore, she argued, a decision protecting such 
elements could generate an absurd cascade of colorably legitimate 
infringement claims.7 If Thicke and Williams could be found liable for using 
generic musical and stylistic elements in earlier works by Marvin Gaye, 
Gaye likewise could be deemed liable for having used generic elements 
found in the songs of legions of songwriters preceding him.8 
Those supporting the Williams v. Gaye verdict have proposed that it 
exposed and remedied a long-standing disparity between copyright 
protection afforded works of Black and White musicians.9 This disparity, 
they claim, can be attributed to the judiciary’s obsolete perspective that the 
protectable scope of a musical work is limited to original melodic, harmonic, 
and rhythmic expression represented in visual notation.10 
In this article, I suggest that this invocation of racial prejudice appears 
to be a gambit to assert control over generic musical elements that copyright 
was never intended to protect.11 I begin with a discussion of the development 
of copyright protection for musical works, and how, over time, recording 
technologies significantly affected the creation of popular musical 
expression, and the means of protecting it. Then I consider whether and how 
 
4 See Joseph P. Fishman, Music as a Matter of Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 
1865 (2018) (citing extensive press coverage supporting his claim that “[i]t’s tough to 
overstate the amount of controversy that the case has generated”). 
5 See id. 
6 Gaye, 895 F.3d at 1141 (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 
7 See id. at 1152. 
8 Id. 
9 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Institute for Intellectual Property and Social 
Justice Musician and Composers and Law, Music, and Business Professors in Support of 
Appellees , Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-56880), 2019 U.S. 
9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 2423, at *20 [hereinafter IIPSJ Brief]; Sean O’Connor et al. 
“Blurred Lines” Ruling Brings Justice to Composers Like Marvin Gaye, SEATTLE TIMES 
(May 6, 2018, 1:01 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/blurred-lines-ruling-
brings-justice-to-composers-like-marvin-gaye/. 
10 See id. 
11 I subscribe to the American Psychological Association style guide’s policy that 
“racial and ethnic groups are designated by proper nouns and are capitalized.” See Kwame 
Anthony Appiah, The Case for Capitalizing the B in Black, THE ATLANTIC (June 18, 
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/time-to-capitalize-blackand-
white/613159/ (arguing that “black and white are both historically created racial 
identities, and whatever rule applies to one applies to the other”). 
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the copyright interests of Black popular musicians have been unfairly 
recognized because of the medium in which many recorded their musical 
expression. I posit that the modes of creation and fixation used by musicians 
of any race are irrelevant to the scope of protectable expression in a musical 
work, and that the ambit of protectable musical expression readily can, and 
should, be defined by its visual representation. I conclude by suggesting that 
rather than expanding the scope of protectable musical expression to 
encompass stylistic and sonic components, contracting it, and even limiting 
protection for melody, would promote creation of innovative musical 
expression, particularly in genres like jazz improvisations and spirituals 
arrangements, to which Black musicians have contributed so significantly. 
 
MUSIC, COPYRIGHT, AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
Since revision in 1831, the United States’ copyright statute has 
expressly protected musical works.12 This addition to protectable books, 
maps and charts occurred a few years after Stephen Foster was born, and 
before the enormous expansion later in the century of the sheet music 
publishing industry.13 Over the nearly two hundred years that followed, the 
scope and duration of statutory protection have grown inexorably, and now 
provide authors exclusive rights, typically for a century or longer, not only 
to copies of their musical compositions rendered in various media, but also 
performances, arrangements, and other works derived from them.14 
Until 1978, when the current U.S. Copyright Act became effective, 
protection for published works was conditioned on the author or owner of 
the work registering and depositing printed copies at the Copyright Office.15 
To register copyrights in musical works applicants were required to submit 
scores, sheet music, or lead sheets delineating the claimed protectable 
musical expression in standard music notation.16 
By the latter half of the twentieth century electric sound recording 
technology had become increasingly effective, inexpensive, and 
ubiquitous.17 This development made it possible for musically illiterate 
performers to document their songs by simply recording their performances 
 
12 Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436. 
13 See generally, HARRY DICHTER & ELLIOTT SHAPIRO, EARLY AMERICAN SHEET 
MUSIC: ITS LURE AND ITS LORE, 1768-1889 (1941).  
14 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332. 
15 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078. 
16 See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that 
under the 1909 Act, the Copyright Office Compendium of 1967 referred to deposits of 
unpublished musical works as manuscripts).  
17See An Audio Timeline, AUDIO ENGINEERING SOCIETY, 
http://www.aes.org/aeshc/docs/audio.history.timeline.html (last updated June 13, 2014). 
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of them. 18 The current copyright statute reflects the sea-change effected by 
recording technology in the generation and recording of popular music. 
Original musical works are now protected if they are “fixed in any tangible 
means of expression,” and the Copyright Office accepts audio recordings as 
deposits for registration of musical works.19 Congress also recognized, in 
1971, the economic value of performances of musical works, and established 
a separate copyright for sound recordings of them.20 Accordingly, if for 
instance, Lady Gaga records Stephen Foster’s “Beautiful Dreamer,” she 
would obtain a copyright for her recorded performance, but not for Foster’s 
song, which is in the public domain. 
Widespread consumer access to recording and synthetic sound 
technologies also led to pandemic music illiteracy among popular 
songwriters.21 The appeal of works of songwriters lacking the ability to 
juggle complex combinations of musical parameters acquired through 
musical literacy, tends to depend more on particular sounds and 
performances than on their works’ typically exiguous musical content.22 
Should we broaden the scope of protectable expression in popular music to 
reflect this shift in the locus of its economic value from musical expression 
to performance? 
 
RACE AND COPYRIGHT FOR MUSICAL WORKS 
 
Discussing “a legacy of unequal [copyright] protection” Professor K.J. 
Greene identifies three reasons why he believes Black authors received “less 
copyright protection”: “(1) inequalities of bargaining power (2) the clash 
between the structural elements of copyright and the oral predicate of Black 
culture, and (3) broad and pervasive social discrimination which both 
devalued Black contributions to the arts and created greater vulnerability to 
exploitation and appropriation of creative works.”23 The first and third of 
these reasons are borne out by historical evidence.24 The second however, is 
 
18 “Thanks to electricity, every consumer can be a producer…Rock’s electronic 
instruments are easy to play and accessible to anyone who has the wherewithal to buy a 
used Fender in a pawn shop.” ROBERT PATTISON, TRIUMPH OF VULGARITY: ROCK MUSIC 
IN THE MIRROR OF ROMANTICISM 136 (1987). 
19 See U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Registrations for Musical Compositions, 
CIRCULAR, no. 50, Oct. 2019, at 1, https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ50.pdf.  
20 See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391. 
21See Jon Henschen, The Tragic Decline of Music Literacy (and Quality), 
INTELLECTUAL TAKEOUT (Aug. 16, 2018), 
https://www.intellectualtakeout.org/article/tragic-decline-music-literacy-and-quality/.  
22 See id. See also infra note 26 and accompanying discussion. 
23 K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal 
Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 356-57 (1999).  
24 See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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more problematic, implying a monolithic Black musical culture that 
copyright law cannot accommodate. 
Since its inception in the early twentieth century the U.S. popular music 
recording industry has differentiated its products by genre: “rhythm & 
blues,” “hip-hop,” “disco,” as well as by social and racial characteristics of 
anticipated consumers: “hillbilly”, “Western”, “race” (i.e., Black), “popular” 
(i.e., White), etc.25 To capitalize on the potential appeal to White consumers 
of works recorded by Black performers on “race” records, mainstream record 
companies produced legally permissible “mirror” recordings of these works 
marketed as “popular”.26 To promote the greatest number of sales among 
White consumers, these companies capitulated to widespread Jim Crow 
sentiment in the United States in first half of the century and engaged White 
performers for these recordings.27 
The unfairness of this practice was compounded by the companies’ 
arguably unwitting misappropriation of copyrightable musical expression 
contained in recordings by Black performers. Professor Robert Brauneis has 
discussed how Black performers in the first half of the twentieth century, 
while performing musical numbers for recordings, often added significant 
original musical expression of their own.28 Because these performers’ 
additional material was not submitted with the registration for the underlying 
work, it devolved to the public domain by “divestitive” publication through 
their recordings. White performers performed and recorded this additional 
expression without compensating, or even acknowledging, its Black authors. 
Particularly during the first half of the Twentieth Century, unscrupulous 
music publishers and agents fraudulently obtained copyrights for works by 
Black musicians, capitalizing on their lack of awareness of their rights; their 
often-straitened finances; lack of verbal literacy; and by simple theft.29 White 
musicians, particularly those from poor rural communities, also suffered 
such unethical and illicit acts. The 1909 Act, effective at that time, did not 
facilitate this conduct; in fact it promulgated civil and criminal penalties for 
such deliberate infringements.30 Like many other outbreaks of unethical or 
 
25 See William G. Roy, “Race Records” and “Hillbilly Music”: Institutional 
Origins of Racial Categories in the American Commercial Recording Industry, 32 
POETICS 265 (2004).  
26 See Robert Brauneis, Copyright, Music, and Race: The Case of Mirror Cover 
Recordings 7 (Jul. 22, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3591113 (mentioning that the 
compulsory license provision in the Copyright Act of 1909 established the legality of this 
practice).  
27 See id. at 8. 
28 See id. at 7.  
29 See generally Greene, supra note 23. 
30 See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 25-28, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081-82. 
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illegal behavior, one can attribute this one to social ills like racism, poverty, 
illiteracy, and unequal access to legal advice. 
Nearly a century on, race continues to play a significant role in 
marketing popular music. Today, however, White songwriters/performers no 
longer eschew certain musical and stylistic elements commonly associated 
with the works of Black songwriters/performers. Instead, Bruce Springsteen, 
Justin Bieber, Justin Timberlake, Robin Thicke, and many other White pop 
musicians calculatedly incorporate musical and stylistic elements, as well as 
visual elements like dress and gestures, associated with Black culture, in 
their songs, and their performances of them.31 
Like the producers of White “mirrors” who profited from avoiding 
stereotypical elements associated with performances by Black musicians, or 
who incorporated only those elements considered appealing to mainstream 
audiences, White musicians now profit by embracing them.32 One reason for 
doing so is to flatter their White fans who believe that by appreciating and 
purchasing recorded and live performances of musicians whose work 
ostensibly demonstrates enlightened views about racial parity and 
inclusivity, these attributes can be ascribed to them as well.33 
There is little question that, particularly in the first half of the twentieth 
century, Black songwriters suffered unequal copyright protection because of 
racial prejudice, and illicit conduct by White music industry impresarios. 
Next we consider the more difficult question whether bias against the 
creative modes and media commonly ascribed to Black musicians has 
contributed to this record of unequal protection.34 
Those claiming that copyright law has inadequately protected musical 
works by Black authors have based this assertion on arguments about the 
collaborative ethos of composition among Black musicians;35 the emphasis 
 
31See PATTISON, supra note 18, at 44 (musing on the implications of a Bruce 
Springsteen album cover with an image of the White Springsteen “recumbent upon” 
Black saxophonist Clarence Clemons). 
32 This embrace is underscored by use of stereotypical visual imagery associated 
with Black performers captured in the audio-video recordings of choreographed 
performances. E.g., Justin Timberlake, Like I Love You, YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQ3slUz7Jo8.   
33 British pop singers who perform with American accents have similar financial 
motivations. Shunning the sound of English accents long associated with Victorian 
primness in American popular entertainment, for example, MARY POPPINS (Walt Disney 
Productions 1964), MY FAIR LADY (Warner Bros. 1964), THE KING AND I (20th Century-
Fox)) they adopt mid- or low-brow American intonation and vernacular to profit from the 
vulgarity and unrestraint they signal, which are essential to the merchantability of most 
popular songs today. See PATTISON, supra note 18, at 151 et seq.   
34 See GREENE, supra note 23, at 356.  
35 See Elizabeth Rosenblatt, Copyright’s One-Way Racial Appropriation Ratchet, 
53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 605 (2019) (claiming “copyright disadvantages those whose 
backgrounds and cultural forms embrace cumulative creation and oral transmission of 
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Black musicians place on oral rather than written traditions;36 Black 
musicians’ frequent borrowing of existing expression;37 and Black 
musicians’ focus on performance rather than the underlying musical work.38 
While Williams v. Gaye  was under appeal, the Institute for Intellectual 
Property and Social Justice submitted an amicus brief supporting the Gaye 
family.39  Its authors repeatedly claim that the Copyright Office’s policy 
prior to 1978, that applicants submit notated copies of musical works with 
their applications was discriminatory.40 
Until 1978 the Copyright Office would register only musical works 
represented in visible notation.41 Black songwriters may have been less 
likely than their White counterparts to be versed in music notation. This is 
the basis of the argument of those claiming that this requirement reveals 
 
creative techniques”). Ann Bartow makes a similar claim on behalf of women, that 
copyright poorly accommodates communally created works like quilts, that are typically 
associated with women. See Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism 
and Copyright Law, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 551, 573-74 (2006).  
36 See GREENE, supra note 23, at 355, n.68 (noting that like indigenous folklore, 
musical works by Black musicians were often fixed, and then claimed, by individuals 
other than the authors).  
37 See Olufunmilayo Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, 
Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 622 (2006) (suggesting, for 
instance, that “features associated with hip hop are intensive borrowing, which is at odds 
with contemporary perceptions of composition that see borrowing as necessarily signaling 
a lack of originality”). 
38 See Larisa K. Mann, Decolonizing Copyright Law: Learning from the Jamaican 
Street Dance 60 (Fall 2012) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 
Berkeley), https://escholarship.org/content/qt7h8449q6/qt7h8449q6.pdf (identifying 
“syncretism and phonographic orality” as key characteristics of Jamaican music, neither 
of which copyright accommodates). 
39 See IIPSJ BRIEF, supra note 9. 
40 “The Copyright Office’s former policy of requiring written music deposits 
contravened the 1909 Act and also discriminated against traditionally marginalized 
composers.” Id. at *11. “Composers not fluent in European staff notation, composers who 
work in aural traditions and genres where such notation is not very helpful, and composers 
from disadvantaged backgrounds have routinely been discriminated against by a 
copyright system at times improperly administered so as to extend protection to only 
certain kinds of privileged works.” Id. at *46-47. See also, Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
at 21, Skidmore v. Zeppelin 952 F. 3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 20-142) (claiming that 
limiting protected musical expression to that recorded in music notation “will most 
heavily impact historically disenfranchised communities (black blues artists, for 
example…)”). 
41 See Robert Brauneis, Musical Work Copyright for the Era of Digital Sound 
Technology: Looking Beyond Composition and Performance, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 1, 4 (2014) (“[Before the 1976 Copyright Act] musical compositions still needed 
to be fixed in scores to gain copyright protection”). During the 1920s and 30s the 
Copyright Office also accepted piano rolls as deposits for music registrations. See IIPSJ 
Brief, supra note 9, at *22. 
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copyright law’s bias favoring White authors.42 However, many White 
popular songwriters active before 1978 also were incapable of writing or 
reading music notation.43 Moreover, songwriters who are incapable of 
writing music have long employed literate musicians to transcribe their 
performances as sheet music and lead sheets.44 Perhaps access to these 
transcribers by Black songwriters may have been more limited than that of 
Whites, but such transcriptions have been used to register thousands of songs 
by both Black and White authors.45 
Those who claim that the earlier law’s visual representation 
requirement discriminated against, or at least disadvantaged, Black 
songwriters have suggested that by allowing audible media to be used to 
register musical works, Black songwriters were, finally, able to obtain 
copyright protection as readily as Whites.46 More problematically, they 
claim that this broadening of acceptable media by which works may be 
registered implies a broadening of the scope of protectable expression of 
musical works fixed in audio recordings.47 In fact, there is no correlation 
 
42 See IIPSJ BRIEF, supra note 9, at *22 (asserting that “the form-of-deposit 
discrimination problem arose because many of our nation’s most gifted [and 
internationally acclaimed] composers who worked outside of the European classical or 
formal music tradition—albeit squarely within emerging twentieth century Western 
popular music genres—were not fluent in European staff notation”). 
43 Including Irving Berlin, Elvis Presley, The Beatles, and Bruce Springsteen.  
David Galeson, From “White Christmas” to Sgt. Pepper: The Conceptual Revolution in 
Popular Music, NBER WORKING PAPER 13308, August 2007, at 16, 23.  
44 Irving Berlin, for instance, hired a musically literate pianist to realize and 
“transcribe” his melodies. See ALEXANDER WOOLLCOTT, THE STORY OF IRVING BERLIN 
37 (1925). 
45 Marvin Gaye’s publisher employed a music transcriber to register copyrights 
for his songs, including “Got to Give it Up”. See IIPSJ BRIEF, supra note 9, at *32. See 
also Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1063 (rejecting Skidmore’s claim that limiting protection to 
musical expression represented in visual notation disadvantaged musically illiterate 
authors, noting that the author of the complaining work had no difficulty in obtaining or 
paying for a transcription of the music in his recorded performance of it).   
46 See Elizabeth Rosenblatt, Copyright’s One-Way Racial Appropriation Ratchet, 
53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 632-33 (2019) (suggesting that “[g]ranting protection to 
sound recordings was certainly not all bad for creators of color, as it tended to counteract 
some of the prejudices against non-notable works”). 
47 The authors of the IIPSJ Brief argue that “[i]f Gershwin could notate for old-
fashioned car squeeze bulbs as he did in “An American in Paris,” … and to which 
presumably the copyright in that composition extends—why could Gaye not also enjoy 
protection for his R&B or Soul orchestral composition as to the material executed by 
cowbells and background voices?” IIPSJ BRIEF, supra note 9, at *49-50. In fact, 
Gershwin’s use of a bulb horn, and Gaye’s use of a cowbell, are musical ideas, and not 
protectable expression. Accordingly, when he used a bulb horn in his De Profundis for a 
Speaking Pianist (1982) Frederic Rzewski did not have to obtain the Gershwin estate’s 
authorization. Likewise, for example, Rossini’s well-known unusual use of the violin bow 
(tapping bow sticks against music stands) in the overture to La scala de seta (1812) was 
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between a work’s protectable expression and the medium in which it is 
recorded. While the choice of medium may affect the type of expression 
recorded, it does not bear on whether, or the extent to which, it is protectable. 
 
 
SCOPE OF PROTECTION FOR ORIGINAL MUSICAL 
EXPRESSION 
 
The U.S. Copyright Act identifies, but does not define, “musical works” 
as a category of protectable expression.48 The Compendium of U.S. 
Copyright Practices, however, which “provides expert guidance” on 
copyright, identifies “main elements of copyrightable musical work 
authorship [as] melody, rhythm, harmony, and lyrics, if any.”49 Of course, 
musical works may also comprise many other elements like instrumentation, 
dynamics, tempo, phrasing, etc. But the fact that the U.S. Copyright Office 
did not include these within the “main elements” of musical works, implies 
a hierarchy of significance among them that musicians have intuited from 
time immemorial. They fall along a spectrum ranging between 
sound/performance elements at one end, to more purely musical elements 
like melody at the other. One can identify these poles as the how and the 
what of music. Melody, for instance, lies on the what end of the spectrum, 
whereas dynamics lie on the how side. Melody and harmony tell us what 
notes to perform, while dynamics tell us how to perform them.50 
This spectrum also indicates a hierarchy of dependency among musical 
elements. The significance of dynamics, instrumentation, tempos, and even 
the key of a song depends entirely upon its more fundamentally musical 
elements of melody, harmony, and rhythm. Imagine a musical work 
containing a tempo, meter, key, phrasings, instrumentation, and perhaps 
even a verbal text, but no melody, rhythm, or harmony. The work is 
meaningless because, apart from the words, it contains no information about 
what to perform.  Two high-profile copyright cases from over a century ago, 
involving mechanical reproductions of musical works, are curiously relevant 
on the issues of hierarchy and dependency among musical elements. 
 
an idea that later composers could freely use. Only the particular rhythmic figure to which 
Rossini applied the idea, might be considered protectable musical expression.    
48 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). 
49 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 
802.3 (3d ed. 2017). 
50 Aaron Keyt has alluded to the copyright significance of this spectrum when he 
explains that musical works are not works of sound: “composers do not create sounds at 
all; they create only musical structures which are revealed through sound." Copyrightable 
expression in musical works, therefore, is based upon "what the sounds do, how they are 
used, rather than what they are in acoustical terms.” Comment: An Improved Framework 
for Music Plagiarism Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 421, 436-37 (1988).  
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In 1899 English music publisher Boosey & Co. sued Whight, a 
manufacturer of piano rolls, claiming Whight infringed the copyrights in a 
number of works Boosey owned.51 Piano rolls are paper scrolls that have 
been perforated to indicate the melody, harmony, and rhythm of a musical 
work.52 These perforations can be “read” and then sounded by a mechanical 
piano or organ, just as the tuned metal tines of a music box “read” melody, 
harmony, and rhythm designated by the pins on the rotating metal barrel, 
which they pluck.53 
The court decided that piano rolls were not infringing because the 
musical information recorded in their perforations is not intelligible to 
humans in standard notation.54 But the rolls also provided printed verbal cues 
about changes in speed and volume to be affected by the human operator of 
the mechanical organ or piano playing the work. These dynamic and tempo 
indications corresponded with those in Boosey’s sheet music. As these were 
visually intelligible, the court concluded they did infringe.55 Accordingly, 
while the court permitted the defendant to copy plaintiff’s most significant 
musical information, it prohibited copying of its least essential and original 
musical elements. Nearly a decade later, in a factually similar dispute 
involving a music publisher named White-Smith, the United States Supreme 
Court concluded likewise that unauthorized piano roll reproductions of 
protected musical works were not infringing copies.56 
Latent behind the tortured reasoning of both decisions was a last-minute 
protocol to the Berne Copyright Convention of 1886, which established that 
copies of copyrighted musical works that enabled mechanical renderings of 
them, were not infringing.57 In the nineteenth century the Swiss were the 
most important developers and manufacturers of music boxes (and watches 
with similar mechanisms).58 It appears this Swiss industry capitalized upon 
the goodwill from their nation’s convening and hosting the Convention, and 
 
51 See Boosey v. Whight, 1 Ch. 836, (1899) (Eng.).  
52 See generally, Thomas W. Patteson, Player Piano, OXFORD HANDBOOKS 
ONLINE, Nov. 2014, 
https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935321.001.0001/o
xfordhb-9780199935321-e-16.  
53 Id.  
54 See Boosey, 1 Ch. 836. 
55 Id.  
56 See White-Smith v. Apollo, 209 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1907).  
57 See BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC 
WORKS (1886) 687 (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds., Berne Primary Sources on 
Copyright (1450-1900)), www.copyrighthistory.org.  
58 See MUSICBOX INFOS, http://www.alscher.ch/en/musicbox_infos.html (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2021).  
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lobbied the other national participants to accommodate this curious 
carveout.59  
 
The player piano industry boomed in the first decade of the twentieth 
century in the United States and in Europe, and sales of piano rolls 
supplanted those of sheet music.60 To avert ruinous financial consequences 
facing songwriters in the wake of the Boosey and White-Smith decisions, the 
Berne Convention and the U.S. Copyright Act were amended at that time to 
protect copyrighted musical works fixed in formats read by machines.61 
The Boosey and White-Smith decisions are egregious for unfairly 
limiting protection of songwriters’ most valuable expression, i.e. melody, 
harmony, and rhythm. Cases like Williams v. Gaye, on the other hand, are 
damaging because they expand protection beyond original musical 
expression. Copyright should protect as music only original melodic, 
rhythmic, and harmonic expression. Western notation most effectively and 
efficiently records expression incorporating these fundamental musical 
elements. Copyright should not protect particular dynamics, phrasing, tempi, 
instrumentation, and other stylistic elements as music, because authors’ 
particular deployments of these elements evidences more non-protectable 
ideas than it does protectable expression. 
Legally protecting ideas defeats copyright’s fundamental objective to 
incentivize the production of original expression, because it enables 
monopolization of generic elements of musical, verbal, and visual 
expression. For musicians, elements like instrumentation and dynamics are 
akin to generic shapes and colors used by visual artists, or the punctuation 
and emphases by which writers organize and inflect their words. 
The fact that Jeff Koons may have been the first to render balloon 
animals in shiny metal does not give him the right to prevent others from 
similar play because they are only copying the earlier artist’s idea.62 
 
59 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, THE BERNE CONVENTION 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS FROM 1886 TO 1986, 156 (1986) 
(providing the report from the 1908 Berlin Convention that eliminated this carveout: 
“[f]or tunes a certain degree of dispensation was introduced in the 1886 Final Protocol, 
but this dispensation cannot extend beyond the terms that established it.”).   
60 See EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 31 (2000), 
http://www.edwardsamuels.com/illustratedstory/isc2.htm. 
61 See REVISED BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND 
ARTISTIC WORKS OF NOV. 13, 1908 (1908), https://www.keionline.org/wp-
content/uploads/1908_Berne_Convention.pdf; Copyright Act of 1909 §12, 35 Stat. 1075 
(1909).  
62 “Why is ‘Balloon Dog' . . . said to be by Jeff Koons? Mr. Koons did not 
conceive the original balloon figure of a dog, nor did he create the gigantic finished 
piece, made by Carlson & Company. Mr. Koons simply found something to duplicate 
and suggested making it big and shiny.” Peter E. Rosenblatt, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. 
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Likewise, the distinctive onomatopoeia and extravagant punctuation 
associated with the style of the late Tom Wolfe, are unprotected ideas by 
which he inflected original strings of words by which he created 
copyrightable literary expression.63 Literary elements like punctuation, 
emphases, and diacritical marks enrich the meaning of these sequences, but 
have no literary significance independent of them. Musical elements like 
dynamics, performing styles, tempos, and instrumentation similarly enhance 
the melodies, harmonies and rhythms to which they are applied, but have no 
independent musical significance. 
 
MORE LIMITED PROTECTION FOR MELODY 
 
The IIPSJ Brief amici argued that using recorded performances, rather 
than visual notation, to determine the scope of a work’s original musical 
expression, would promote more equitable protection of musical works.64 
This approach would permit non-musically literate songwriters in particular, 
to protect instrumentation, styles, timbres, and other secondary musical 
elements in their recorded songs.65 As mentioned earlier, in her Williams v. 
Gaye dissent, Judge Jacqueline Nguyen discredited this suggestion when she 
observed that expanding protection to previously unprotectable elements 
ultimately only increases the potential infringement liability of those 
asserting ownership of these musical ideas.66 
In fact, American songwriters and musicians, musically literate or 
otherwise, would benefit from a narrower view of protectable musical 
expression which, under certain circumstances, might not even encompass 
melody. Melody is the most memorable and identifiable component of most 
musical works. To recall or communicate a popular song we cannot hum its 
harmony; we might tap a brief rhythmic figure from it, but more typically 
we will hum its melody, which conjures both the rhythm and harmony (and 
words) of the song. 
In his examination of the long-standing primacy of melodic similarity 
in adjudication of music copyright infringement disputes, Professor Joseph 
Fishman observes that “[t]he notion that melody today is the primary locus 
of music's value, however defined, is a fiction.”67 This is true, but the fact 
 
TIMES (May 4, 2008), https://archive.nytimes.com/query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage-
990DE1DD1230F937A35756C0A96E9C8B63.html. 
63 See Dexter Schraer, Recommended: Tom Wolfe, 70 THE ENG. J. 49 (1981) 
(characterizing Wolfe’s stringing together long lists of hyphenated words as a “rhetorical 
trick”).  
64 See IIPSJ Brief, supra note 9, at *50. 
65 Id.  
66 895 F.3d 1106, 1141 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 
67 Fishman, supra note 4, at 1904.  
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that melody may no longer be the engine of economic value in popular songs 
does not mean that other musical components have assumed this role. This 
is certainly true of so many popular songs today, whose financial success 
depends mainly upon the appeal of the songwriters/performers, and audio 
and video engineers’ artful massaging of their recorded performances into 
marketable products.68 In other words, the relative importance of various 
compositional components (melody, timbre, style, etc.) to a work’s musical 
value does not vary. Even if, for instance, electronically generated 
background timbres, or distinctive vocal technique, or clever lyrics, generate 
most of the appeal of a popular song, this fact does not elevate the musical 
significance of these attributes.  
Professor Fishman argues that courts’ ongoing focus on melody, despite 
its lessened significance in much popular music, remains useful because this 
“unidimensional” test provides a degree of predictability in music 
infringement disputes that is not available in claims involving other 
copyrightable works.69 But courts’ persistent emphasis on melodic similarity 
in adjudicating infringement claims has been beneficial also because it has 
prevented monopolization of secondary musical, and sonic, elements, 
despite the fact that these elements may generate most of the economic value, 
and even aesthetic appeal, of a popular song. 
The judiciary’s longstanding view that melody is the most protectable 
component of a musical work, however, is troublesome in connection with 
two musical genres to which Black musicians have made such significant 
contributions: jazz, and spiritual arrangements. Both genres incorporate 
existing melodic material from public domain or copyrighted works.70 The 
authors’ objective in both genres is to recontextualize the preexisting 
melody; often to outdo the author of the original musical context in virtuosity 
and complexity, even to the extent that the preexisting material may be no 
longer, or only faintly, perceptible.71 Works of jazz in particular vary 
 
68 “The significance of those manipulating electrical knobs and sliders to the 
appeal of a live performance or recording is obvious when one considers the consequence 
of their absence, along with that of the electricity that powers their mixers, amplifiers, and 
speakers . . . sound engineers manipulate the recorded and amplified sounds of voices of 
performers like Madonna, Kanye West, Miley Cyrus, and Justin Timberlake to ensure 
their appeal to mainstream taste.  Of course, the appeal of the vocal rendering of these 
stars also depends greatly on their physical appearance; if Justin Timberlake gained 100 
pounds his voice might improve, but it is safe to assume that his earnings from [audio-
video recordings of performances made while obese] would worsen.”  Cronin, supra note 
2, at 1225.  
69 See Fishman, supra note 4, at 1908-09.  
70 See Sandra Jean Graham, Spiritual, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE (2020); DARIUSZ 
TEREFENKO, JAZZ THEORY: FROM BASIC TO ADVANCED STUDY, 251 et seq.  (2d ed. 2017).  
71 See Mark Tucker & Travis A. Jackson, Jazz, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE (2020). 
(noting how in “‘cutting contests’ musicians took turns building long, virtuosic solos 
designed to impress or outdo opposing players.”).  
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considerably in the degree to which they depart from the musical context of 
the original melody;72 the same is true of classical music’s theme-and-
variation format.73 
The fact that jazz and spiritual arrangements plainly incorporate 
existing melodies raises the question whether, under copyright law, they are 
derivative or transformative works. The Copyright Statute defines derivative 
works, but not transformative works.74 Unauthorized works that incorporate 
another’s copyrighted expression are only deemed “transformative” if they 
can be accommodated under the “fair use” provision of the Copyright 
Statute.75 A significant body of case law has addressed the question of what 
makes a work “transformative”, which has engendered predictable 
uncertainty and complexity as how best to answer it.76 
The creator of a derivative work must first obtain authorization from 
the owner of the underlying work.77 This authorization commonly involves 
financial consideration.78 The author of a transformative work, on the other 
hand, is not required to obtain such authorization so long as he creates 
“something new, with a further purpose or different character, [that does] not 
substitute for the original use of the work.”79 This definition nicely describes 
the objective of most jazz musicians performing “standards”.80 However, 
because these “standards” are often melodies of well-known copyrighted 
songs,  jazz works that allude to them have typically been considered 
derivative of them.81 
 
72 See id.  
73 See Elaine Sisman, Variations, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE (2001) (identifying many 
types of variations like “ostinato”, “constant harmony”, “melodic outline”, “fantasy” that 
vary significantly in the extent they depart from the musical context of the original 
melody). 
74 Derivative works are “based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a 
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, 
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which 
a work may be recast, transformed or adapted.” Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2018).    
75 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).    
76 See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (2019) (analyzing the disparate views of 
many court opinions that have dealt with this issue since Federal Judge Pierre Leval 
coined the term in his Harvard Law Review article in 1990).     
77 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018).  
78 See Note, Jazz Has Got Copyright Law and That Ain’t Good, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1940, 1945 (2005). 




80 Note, supra note 78, at 1942 (noting that jazz standards are those pieces "that a 
professional musician may be expected to know”).  
81 Id. (“These standards, also referred to as ‘mainstream standards’, were generally 
written in the 1930s, '40s, and '50s for film and Tin Pan Alley or Broadway musicals by 
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Like jazz numbers, arrangements of spirituals borrow preexisting 
melodies (and words), and therefore they too may be considered derivative 
rather than transformative of them.82 Because the melodies incorporated into 
spirituals arrangements are from African American religious folksongs 
originating between the late-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, 
however, they are in the public domain, and arrangers do not need to obtain 
authorization to incorporate them into their works.83 While authors of 
spirituals arrangements cannot prevent other arrangers from keying off the 
same religious folksongs, they can prevent others from copying their original 
musical recontextualizations of these folksongs, which copyright protects.84 
Under the compulsory license provision of the U. S. Copyright Act 
anyone may arrange and record a musical work for which the copyright 
owner has already released a sound recording, as long as the arrangement 
does not change the melody or “fundamental character of the work.”85 It is 
peculiar, therefore, that jazz musicians typically rely upon compulsory 
licenses to use these “standards” given that jazz arrangements invariably 
change both the melody and the fundamental character of the popular songs 
that inspired their creation. 86 Unlike arrangers of spirituals, however, jazz 
musicians’ copyright interest in their musical recontextualizations depends 
on terms established with the owner of the “standard”.87 
There is no clear delineation between derivative and transformative 
musical works, but the greater the extent to which the value of a later work 
depends upon preexisting musical expression, the more we should regard it 
as derivative rather than transformative, of the preexisting expression. Piano 
reductions of operas, symphonies, ballets, etc., for instance, are very useful, 
but they are highly derivative because their value as musical works depends 
almost entirely on preexisting expression.88 On the other hand, while 
preexisting melodies may be the spark behind many jazz improvisations and 
arrangements of spirituals, the musical value of these works is generated 
 
non-jazz musicians such as George Gershwin, Cole Porter, and Harold Arlen. Thus, jazz 
performers are typically not the copyright owners of the very pieces that undergird the 
jazz canon”). 
82 See Graham, supra note 70. 
83See African American Spirituals, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS PERFORMING ARTS 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.loc.gov/item/ihas.200197495/.  
84 See Paul J. Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors, 
Copy Machines, and New Arrangements of Public Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241, 248 
(1996) (noting that “nothing in an arrangement of a public domain music composition is 
protected unless it qualifies as a ‘derivative work.’”).  
85 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
86 See Note, supra note 78 at 1945.  
87 See id.  
88 See David Charlton & Kathryn Whitney, Score, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE (2020). 
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almost entirely by the later musician,89 and we should, accordingly, regard 
these works as transformative per se.90 
For centuries composers have used preexisting melodies as the generic 
kernels of transformative theme-and-variations and, more recently, jazz 
improvisations, and choral arrangements.91 These musical metamorphoses 
can be so artful and complex that the original melodies are rendered 
essentially foils that reflect the later musician’s virtuosity.92 More 
significantly, these later works do not undermine, but typically enhance, the 
value we ascribe to the works whose melodies they incorporate.93 
The same would be true of a hypothetical improvisation by Winton 
Marsalis on “Let it Go” from Disney’s Frozen. Disney might be pleased if 
Winton Marsalis publicly performed and recorded this improvisation, but it 
would undoubtedly be more than displeased if Marsalis did not first obtain 
the company’s authorization and agree to give Disney a portion of the profits 
from his performances and recordings. Disney’s legal capacity to compel 
Marsalis to do so based upon the entrenched notion that his improvisation is 
a derivative rather than a transformative work, is paradoxical and unfair 
given that his recording would only enhance the reputation and profitability 
of Disney’s song. 
 
 
89 The late Moses Hogan, a classmate of mine at Oberlin years ago, became well 
known for the spirituals arrangements he wrote in the tragically few, but enormously 
productive, years he lived following his formal education. While the melodies and words 
of public domain spirituals were the wellspring of Hogan’s work, the vocal scores in 
which he documented his reworkings evidence brilliant original melodic, harmonic, and 
rhythmic expression. This expression’s value is manifest by the enduring appeal of his 
works; there are hundreds of other arrangements of well-known spirituals, but few are 
performed, as often (or as globally) as Hogan’s. Drawing on knowledge acquired at 
Oberlin (and later Juilliard) he wrought original musical expression far more complex 
than, yet reverential toward, the underlying works. Copyright provided incentives and 
rewards by giving him the exclusive right to copy and perform his arrangements, but it 
did not limit others’ use of the underlying public domain spirituals that inspired his work. 
See generally, Anne Shelley, Moses Hogan, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE (2012).   
90 “Jazz musicians and aficionados rarely care what actual piece is being played - 
they care how it is played and by whom. The underlying song is simply a vehicle for 
showcasing the musician's true ideas and spontaneous compositions.” Note, supra note 
78, at 1952. 
91 See Sisman, supra note 73.   
92 Beethoven’s 33 Variations on a Waltz by Diabelli is one of the best-known 
examples of this phenomenon. See MAYNARD SOLOMON, BEETHOVEN 347 (Schirmer 
Books et. al. 2d rev. ed. 1998).   
93 For example, the fact that Frank Churchill’s “Someday My Prince Will Come” 
(Snow White) has remained well known since it was first heard in 1937, can be attributed, 
at least in part, to popular arrangements of it by Miles Davis, David Brubeck, Wynton 
Kelly, and many other jazz musicians. See Stories of Standards: “Someday My Prince 
Will Come,” KUVO (2019), https://www.kuvo.org/stories-of-standards-someday-my-
prince-will-come/. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams did not appeal the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision to the Supreme Court, so the Williams v. Gaye jury verdict can never 
be directly overturned.94 In recent decisions favoring defendants Led 
Zeppelin and Katy Perry, however, courts have averted the pernicious 
implications of Williams v. Gaye.95 In both cases the courts dwelt on the 
limited scope of protection for works with “thin” copyrights, signaling the 
judiciary’s increasing skepticism towards infringement claims based on 
similar stylistic, acoustical, and secondary musical elements.96 
I have argued here furthermore that copyright’s objectives would be 
better served if only virtually identical unauthorized copies of even primary 
musical elements, including melody, were considered infringing. 
Accordingly, an unauthorized piano score that faithfully and fully 
reproduces the principal musical elements of a protected symphonic work 
would be infringing.97 On the other hand, arrangements, fantasies, variations, 
etc. that are inspired by and allude to principal musical elements of a 
protected work should be considered transformative works, which not only 
do not compete with the earlier work in the market but, in fact, promote it.  
Virtually all music infringement disputes could be dismissed if courts 
recognized copyrightable musical expression as limited to melody, harmony, 
 
94 See Joshua Rosenberg, Controversial ‘Blurred Lines’ Suit Ends in $5 Million 
Verdict, FORBES (Dec. 14, 2018, 6:51 PM EST) 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalentertainment/2018/12/14/controversial-blurred-
lines-suit-ends-in-5-million-verdict/#32de4c2b6ffe. 
95 See Gray v. Perry, No. 15-CV-05642-CAS-JCx, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46313 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2020); Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020). The 
plaintiffs in both cases appealed these decisions, Gray to the Ninth Circuit and Skidmore 
to the U.S. Supreme Court. Gray’s appeal is pending before the Ninth Circuit; the U.S. 
Supreme Court denied Skidmore’s petition for a writ of certiorari on October 5, 2020.    
96 See Gray, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *10-11 (Federal Judge Christina Snyder 
referring to Zeppelin to support her determination that only a “virtually identical” 
defending work may infringe a work with “thin” copyright protection).  
97 One does not need to obtain authorization to create a derivative work based 
upon an underlying work in the public domain. However, an underlying work may be in 
the public domain in one country but still protected in others. Pianist Yuja Wang painfully 
learned of such discrepancies when publisher Boosey & Hawkes, owner of the copyright 
to Stravinsky’s Le sacre du printemps, forbade her performance of a faithful arrangement 
of it for piano and percussion that she had programmed for a number of dates in Europe. 
Le Sacre was published in 1921; as a Russian work it immediately entered the public 
domain in the U.S. Many European countries, however, extended the term of copyright 
protection for works published during and between the world wars, and in these countries 
Le sacre will be protected until 2056. See Olivier Vrins, Yuja Wang Barred from Playing 
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and rhythm, and that the medium in which a musical work is fixed should 
not affect the scope of its protection. While the contents of all genres of 
expression, and the media in which they are recorded, continually evolve, 
the scope of their copyrightable expression does not. Otherwise, copyright’s 
objective to incentivize original expression would be compromised through 
inhibiting uncertainty. Because of the regrettable broadening of the scope of 
protectable expression promulgated by dispositions of various infringement 
disputes over the past few decades, American popular songwriters now face 
such uncertainty. Only courts can dispel this incertitude by limiting this 
scope, even excluding melody in cases involving transformative works, to 
restore the healthy cross-pollination of styles and genres that has always 
characterized American popular music. 
 
